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Abstract 
 
Francesca Carnevali’s work stressed the key role of politics and institutions in 
determining a country’s banking structure, which in turn shapes its industrial structure. 
Segmented banking systems in France, Germany and Italy allowed different types of banks to 
specialize in different market segments, ensuring the fulfilment of smaller firms’ financial 
requirements. In Britain, local banks did not survive the wave of amalgamation of the 1960s. 
This void left small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and banks facing high transaction 
costs on the credit market due to little – or even an absence of – knowledge of the local 
business environment.   
Focusing on the Italian case this paper discusses how major parties in the political 
spectrum, as well as economic institutions such as the Bank of Italy, agreed to foster SMEs 
after the Second World War. This led to the establishment of a segmented banking system, in 
which local banks were preserved to serve the financial needs of SMEs clustered in local 
production systems. Then the paper moves on to explore the establishment of the medium-
credit institutes (the Mediocrediti and the Artisan Bank) and their provision of additional 
financial support to SMEs and to artisan firms.  
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1. The political economy of the banking sector  
 
Banking history has traditionally represented the evolution of the banking sector in various 
nations as essentially a market-driven path. This led financial systems to work quite 
efficiently and capital markets were perfectly rational in supplying firms with the funds. If 
there were credit restrictions, criticism should be leveled at macropolicy and not at banks.
1
 
Francesca Carnevali challenged this view by arguing that in the four larger European 
economies the structure of the banking sector has been profoundly shaped by politics and by 
the power relations it reflected. In particular, the differences in the banking and industrial 
structures between these countries were to a large extent the result of the state’s attitude 
towards small firms.
2
 
Thus, in the twentieth century Britain became the economy with the most 
concentrated banking sector and industry in Europe. As local banks disappeared, nothing 
replaced them to make use of the information possessed by local networks to fund viable 
investment projects of small firms clustered in regional economies. Instead, the French, 
German and Italian banking systems remained segmented, with Italy being the highest 
example of segmentation. In these countries local and regional banks retained the larger share 
of commercial lending and the state intervened with the promotion of additional public and 
semi-public lending institutions. A segmented banking system allowed different types of 
banks to specialize in different types of customers in different geographical areas, ensuring 
the fulfilment of the credit needs of those smaller firms whose borrowing power from the 
capital market did not match their political power.  
The interplay that took place between the state and social and economic groups 
representing small firms in France, Germany, and Italy did not happen in Britain, where small 
firms had little lobbying power and political representation. Moreover, small firms occupied 
an important place in the cultural identity of the three Continental nations, where they were 
seen as preservers of social stability and as valuable pools of votes, which was not the case in 
Britain. Thus, according to Carnevali, when seeking the causes of the decline of small firms 
in Britain it is to the absence of this dialectical process that one must turn.  
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By hinging on Carnevali’s view, this paper explores how political action in Italy gave 
rise to the most intense case of banking regulation and provision of medium-term subsidized 
finance with the explicit aim of actively promoting the expansion of the small firm sector. 
This was one of the factors, after WW2, which led to the development of strong industrial 
districts made up of highly efficient and internationally competitive small firms.   
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the role of politics and institutions 
in shaping the structure of Italy’s corporate economy. Sections 3 and 4 focus on the 
establishment of institutions charged with the provision of medium-term finance for SMEs 
and the geographical distribution of subsidized credit. Section 5 deals with the financial 
infrastructure created to support a specific group of small businesses, i.e. artisan firms. 
Sections 6 and 7 assess the provision and geographical distribution of credit for artisan firms. 
 
 
2. Politics, institutions, and small firms in Italy 
 
Italy has an industrial structure which is in many respects unique amongst the most advanced 
economies, as it is characterized by a dominance of small and medium-sized firms 
(henceforth SMEs) often clustered in local production systems, and a marginal role of large 
firms.
3
   
In the last 30 years, a widely held rhetoric has seen SMEs as a sort of natural path of 
Italian industrialization which is essentially market-driven. This view emphasizes the 
dynamic role of SMEs in traditional sectors, and their ability to exploit the comparative 
advantage of a country with very easy access to labour without any relevant government or 
public policy support.
4
 In this perspective, some long-term coincident factors were crucial to 
the success of Italian small firms: the Italian extended family; the preservation of aspects of 
the late medieval communal civilization in the Centre-North and in particular of craft skills 
and craft tradition; the existence of merchant traditions connecting the Italian provinces to the 
world markets; the sophisticated and fragmented distribution channels that represent a 
demanding intermediate buyer which prompts enormous variety for the “Made in Italy” 
products; their propensity to aggregate in industrial districts (IDs) – i.e., geographic clusters 
of small firms each specialized in one or a few phases of the same production process – and 
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the willingness of local governments to create the infrastructure and services to support small 
firms’ development.5 Moreover, since the 1970s Italian SMEs and IDs benefited from a 
number of important trends in the world economy. One trend is the shift from standardized, 
mass-produced products toward more customized, higher-styled, higher quality goods. 
Another is the movement of production technology away from inflexible, scale-intensive 
processes towards those with more flexibility that are suitable for, and adaptable to, small 
production runs.
6
 
At the same time, this rhetoric holds that large companies in capital intensive 
oligopolistic sectors are something unnatural to Italy and could be established only thanks to 
government support. As a result, only a few big companies could thrive in the country; these 
were often protected by the state and enjoyed a large market power in the industries in which 
they operated.
7
 State interventionism brought about a kind of “political capitalism” inside 
which entrepreneurs pursued growth not for economic reasons (i.e., to pursue economies of 
scale and scope to cut cost per unit and increase market shares) but to strengthen their 
bargaining power with political authorities.
8
 
A recent work by Colli and Rinaldi
9
 has challenged this view by holding that Italy’s 
peculiar industrial structure is to a minor extent the result of the spontaneous action of market 
forces, i.e., entrepreneurial failures of big business and dynamism of small entrepreneurs. 
This alternative perspective stresses the role that politics and institutions played in 
determining the relative performances of both big business and small firms. Institutional 
failures took place in all the areas in which big business could be supported: 
internationalization, human capital and technological leadership, and the corporate finance 
system. As a result, Italian large firms grew protected on the internal market, strong and in a 
monopolistic position at home but relatively small, and weak, in an international comparison.  
As far as SMEs were concerned, a body of literature has stressed the importance of measures 
put in place by the government in favor of small undertakings, thereby fostering their 
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proliferation. Such measure ranged from artisanship policy, to soft loan schemes for SMEs, to 
labour market regulation, and to the insolvency legislation.
10
 
After WW2, a favourable view with regard to SMEs was expressed by all the Italian 
political parties, headed by the two largest ones: the Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the 
Italian Communist Party (PCI). The major governing party, the DC, had a social project that 
awarded positive value to the petite bourgeoisie, seeking to swell their ranks and thereby 
extend the ideals of economic independence – small firms, skilled craftsmen – throughout 
society.
11
 In emphasizing the role of small ownership, the DC was heir to the very problem 
that had eventually urged Catholics into the political arena: the struggle to deflect the 
proletariat from the attractions of socialism. This “great labour question”, as Leo XIII defined 
it in the Rerum Novarum of 1891, “cannot be solved save by assuming, as a principle, that 
private ownership must be held sacred and inviolable. The law should, therefore, promote 
ownership, and its policy should be to induce as many people as possible to become 
owners”.12 In effect, the proletariat could be redeemed not as workers, but by conversion to 
something else, by restoring all the means of production that are indispensable for conducting 
one’s own livelihood. 
Thus, at the heart of the DC’s analysis, the solutions brought to bear on the labour 
problem centred on the diffusion of property. In the view of the DC, the small producer was 
the very symbol of integral society: he was both employer and labourer; he worked alongside 
his or her assistants and related to them in a highly personal way. Consequently, in the small 
firm, the organisation of work was “more human”, the worker’s dignity “better protected, the 
sense of responsibility and collaboration more keenly developed”. If large firms engendered 
the class struggle, the smaller units fostered solidarity, thus transcending the capital-labour 
divide.
13
 
Moreover, the analysis of the DC was influenced by the views of the Catholic 
economists of the early 20th century, who had stressed the economic rationality of small 
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firms.
14
 The DC never regarded technological progress as a prerogative of the large factory, 
but maintained that its benefits could also be exploited by small firms. Thus, small enterprises 
were considered not as an inferior proxy to large companies, but as an essential element for 
economic development that was to play a central role in the reconstruction of Italy’s 
economy.
15
  
A party that defined itself as “of the centre moving towards the left”, the DC aspired 
to forge a broad alliance of workers, peasants and middle classes. A policy fostering small 
firms made good political sense for two reasons. In the first instance, the diffusion of small 
business would reinforce the class structure of the solidaristic state, and at the same time 
expand what the party saw as its social base of consensus. Second, by dispersing labour 
among a myriad of small firms, chances for collective actions from left-wing trade unionism 
would be minimized and conflict defused. The fundamental concern for the DC was the 
preservation of a particular class structure whose disappearance would have polarized Italian 
society between the industrial proletariat and a very small class of large business owners. An 
expanding middle class of small entrepreneurs would allow the DC to occupy a large “middle 
ground” and tackle the rise of the Communist party.16  
When the DC won Italy’s first general election after WW2 in 1948, it was heavily 
dependent on sources of support outside the party’s direct control. Its outstanding electoral 
victory had been obtained with the massive backing of the Church, the financial assistance of 
big business and the clientelistic support of the southern notables (landowners and 
professional strata): in short, groups that expected a thoroughly conservative policy from the 
DC. However, after the lacklustre result at the next general election in 1953, the balance of 
power within the DC shifted leftwards. Under the new leadership of Amintore Fanfani, the 
party decided to strengthen its penetration in civil society, breaking away from its 
dependence on its traditional backers that restricted the level of support available from other 
social strata. The DC had to stand on its own feet from an organisational standpoint, seeking 
less binding sources of finance, and reducing the level of conditioning by traditional power 
structures. In this scenario, the party became more prone to a policy in favour of small 
firms.
17
 In practice this meant the granting of special fiscal regimes and subsidized credit to 
small and artisan firms, on condition that such firms joined business associations independent 
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from the Confindustria (the Association of Industrialists) and other regulatory bodies, such as 
chambers of commerce. In turn such small firm and artisan associations became weighty 
pressure groups, but also the conduit of the state’s industrial policy.18 
The major opposition party, the PCI, also recognized the importance of attracting the 
middle classes and small entrepreneurs. The PCI set out its small-firm policy in the 
immediate post-war years and further developed it at its 8th Congress in 1956.
19
 According to 
the PCI, large enterprises are the most efficient way of organising production, but, in some 
circumstances – and the Italian case was one of them – they may lead to monopoly or 
oligopoly: both of them tend to limit production in order to maximise profits. Small firms are 
not – contrary to the DC’s thinking – a “type” of enterprise, by their very nature different 
from large concerns. Moreover, small firms are not economically efficient. They are, instead, 
the first stage in the life cycle of capitalist firms, which must either grow or eventually fail. In 
either case, the presence of small firms opposes the tendency to economic stagnation which 
stems from the predominance of monopolies. Thus, the expansion of small firms must be 
encouraged because it facilitates an increase in production, employment and wages, and 
therefore provides an improvement in the living standards of the working class. This 
reasoning was intertwined with other considerations regarding the need for the PCI to distract 
the middle classes from the influence of right-wing forces in order to avoid a possible return 
to an authoritarian regime. On this basis, small entrepreneurs should become “strategic allies” 
of the working class.
20
 These considerations led the PCI to pursue policies in favour of SMEs 
and artisan firms that were very similar to those of the DC.
21
  
 
 
3. The establishment of medium-term credit institutions 
 
The political and economic rationales highlighted in the previous section shaped a 
banking system geared towards meeting the financial requirements of the small business 
sector. Important means to this end were credit institutions specialised in the provision of 
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market and subsidized medium-term credit to SMEs, and their refinancing body the 
Mediocredito Centrale.   
The establishment of credit institutions specialised in the provision of medium-term credit 
to businesses of any size started at the end of the 1940s and stemmed from the reorganization 
of the Italian banking system following the banking crisis of 1931-1933, which culminated in 
the Banking Reform Law in 1936.
22
 This conferred upon the Bank of Italy (BoI) the power of 
shaping the banking sector in terms of market specialization and territorial competence, 
which were in turn related to the legal status of the banks, and from 1975 to the size of their 
deposits.
23
 The BoI divided the credit system into two branches, one comprising institutions 
entitled to take short-term savings and providing short-term finance for working capital 
(henceforth ordinary banks), the other consisting of institutions that take medium- and long-term 
savings and extend medium- and long-term finance and industrial credit (henceforth medium-
term credit institutions, MTCIs).
24
   
 The separation between the short-term and medium-term credit (henceforth MTC) 
markets
25
 should have ensured stability in the banking system, as it implied harmony between 
bank assets and liabilities. It also avoided the excessive freezing of capital that had characterized 
the mixed banks and their collapse,
26
 leading to huge losses for the depositors and political 
repercussions.
27
 However, if this had been the only aim, it would have sufficed to impose a clear 
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equilibrium between medium-term assets and liabilities on the banks, and restricting the banks 
to the short-term credit market would have not been necessary. The decision, supported in 
particular by Donato Menichella (director of the IRI 1933-1944, director of the BoI 1946-1947 
and governor of the BoI 1948-1960) and Alberto Beneduce (president of the IRI 1933-1939, 
president of several of the so-called Beneduce institutions, and senator from 1939 to his death in 
1944) was more about reducing the role of banks in the Italian economy, as in the 1920s banks 
had risen to the head of industrial and financial groups, were the central actors in a tightly 
connected corporate network and were ultimately determining the direction of the country’s 
industrial development.
28
  Therefore, the ultimate aim of the distinction was to bring the banking 
system within the realm of the state economic planning.
29
 
The rigid separation between medium-term savings and credit meant that ordinary banks 
could not access the medium-term market, and thus could not transfer surplus funds from short-
term operations to the medium-term credit market.
30
 In order to navigate around this barrier, 
ordinary banks established Departments of Industrial Credit (DICs) and Medium-tern Credit 
Institutions (MTCIs), so that they could transfer short-term deposits to the medium-term 
market, and provide firms with MTC. The transfer took place by acquiring DIC and MTCI 
bonds, which was a profitable investment in itself, considering these bonds paid higher yields 
than state securities and were risk free. A further source of profit for banks was the sale of 
such bonds to the public. Moreover, by establishing DICs and MTCIs, ordinary banks created 
an intermediary providing firms with assistance in placing their shares on the market.
31
 
 The main public law banks
32
 were the first to establish DICs , the proliferation of which 
took place in the post-war period in connection with the process of economic growth and the 
availability of capital that it required.
33
 This is confirmed by the fact that the BoI nominated the 
DICs at the Southern Banks (Banks of Sicily and of Naples) and the Isveimer as the institutions 
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in charge of financing the industrialization of the South.
34
 The Bank of Sicily was authorized to 
establish a DICs in 1949, and a similar body was set up by the Bank of Naples in 1946 
(however, it is said to have been functioning from 1944). The DICs focused particularly on 
Southern SMEs from 1947 when they were endowed by the state, with the latter agreeing to 
guarantee up to 70 per cent of possible losses. Yet another body of this type, the DIC at the 
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, was established on similar terms. These departments exploited the 
existing banking networks, and their operations could thus be diffused all over the country. A 
definition of SME was not clarified, but the maximum loan was fixed at £15m. The maximum 
was increased to £50m in 1954 and in 1960 the limit of advances was increased to the 20 per 
cent of their paid-up capital.
35
 
 The Centrobanca, Efibanca and Mediobanca were authorized to issue medium-term 
loans throughout the country.
36
 These MTCIs were supposed to finance themselves by placing 
bonds and securities on the market, which were also bought up by the deposit banks.
37
 Only 
Mediobanca financed itself with time deposits (from 1 to 5 years) placed by the public at the 
three Banks of National Interest (BINs, Banca Commerciale Italiana, Credito Italiano, Banco di 
Roma) and could not issue bonds and securities. The peculiarity of the Mediobanca financing 
system was due to the peculiarity of the three BINs. These banks specialized in the highest 
segment of the deposits/credit market and Mediobanca was very selective in its choice of 
industrial projects to finance, particularly in the 1950s.
38
     
This first stage in the creation of institutions dedicated to medium-term finance marks a 
decentralization of the provision of that type of credit and the progressive blurring of the 
distinction between short- and medium-term finance, particularly when considering that few of 
the departments for credit to industry were distinct from the establishing banks, from a legal 
point of view.
39
 In the second stage, the establishment of regional medium-term credit 
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institutions (henceforth RMTCIs, Mediocrediti Regionali), the issue of decentralization is 
combined with the issue of providing medium-term credit to small and medium-sized firms.
40
   
The BoI was aware of the importance of small firms in the Italian economy,
41
 which 
also emerges clearly from a report commissioned by Menichella from the BoI Study Centre.  
The report shows that firms with fewer than 100 workers employed almost 37 per cent of the 
national workforce in 1947.
42
  Recent research has shown that both the Bank of Italy and the 
Confindustria considered small firms were at a disadvantage in accessing finance. However, 
the solutions envisaged by the two institutions were very different. Since 1937, Menichella 
had indicated that the IMI should establish regional medium-term credit institutions 
(henceforth RMTCIs) with the cooperation of banks, and saving banks in particular.
43
  The 
Confindustria, led by Angelo Costa, saw the IMI as inadequate to perform such a task as its 
activity was geared towards large firms, particularly in the sectors of electricity and shipping. 
Only in the management of state subsidies was the IMI displaying a more open attitude 
towards small firms. However, the key point of the controversy was the role that state 
subsidies should have played in the financial activity of the RMTCIs. Costa was aware that 
the new institutions had to face fierce competition from the IMI and IRI on the bond market, 
in order to finance themselves, which would have not allowed them to offer finance at the 
lowest possible interest rate, which was presented as an indispensable step towards the 
country’s industrial reconstruction. The fulfilment of this aim was seen as dependent on 
subsidies provided by the state and within the framework of the European Recovery 
Programme. Menichella was diffident toward the establishment of institutions that would 
have not been able to support themselves on the market and that would have needed state 
subsidies beyond specific and extraordinary circumstances.
44
  
                                                          
40
 G. Piluso, ‘Gli istituti di credito speciale’, Annali di Storia Einaudi, vol. 15: F. Amatori, D. Bigazzi, R. 
Giannetti and L. Segreto (eds), L’industria (Turin, 1999), p. 517. 
41
 Banca d’Italia, Relazione Annuale, 1952, p. 289. 
42
 Asso and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, p. 464.  On the perceived importance of small firms, particularly in the 
late 1950s, see G. Scimone, ‘The Italian Miracle’, in: J. Hennessy, V. Lutz and G. Scimone, Economic Miracles 
(Leavesden, 1964), pp. 179-182 and 218. The author considers the proliferation of small firms as one of the 
bases of the Italian economic miracle. 
43 D. Menichella, ‘Memoria sottoposta dall’IRI all’ esame della Corporazione della previdenza e del credito’, 
(Rome, 1937) published in F. Cotula, C.O. Gelsomino and A. Gigliobianco, Donato Menichella. Stabilità e 
sviluppo dell’economia italiana 1946-1960, vol. I: Documenti e discorsi (Rome-Bari, 1997), pp. 128-152. Such 
perceptions  are also clearly expressed by contemporary studies such as G. Dominici, ‘La funzione propulsiva 
del credito nell’industrializzazione del Mezzogiorno e delle Isole’, Bancaria, 11 (1955), p. 810; N. Garrone ‘Il 
Credito Industriale in Italia’, Rassegna Economica, 4 (1956), pp. 616-617; A.S. Camilleri, Industrial Medium-
Term Financial Institutions in Italy (1966), p. 2. 
44Asso and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, pp. 408-416. 
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Law 445/50, establishing the first RMTCI in Piedmont, marked a compromise 
between the two stances, as the possibility that such institutions would receive subsidies was 
left open. The law opened the possibility for insurance companies to contribute to the 
establishment of the institutions, by increasing the ceiling on the RMTCIs’ loans from 15 to 
50 million lire and allowing them to operate through the branches of their establishing 
banks.
45
 Although the establishment of the first regional term-credit institution was 
authorized in 1950, the proliferation of such institutions occurred from 1953 onwards in 
Northern and Central Italy. Only at a much later stage - the beginning of the 1980s - did the 
Interministerial Committee for Credit and Savings (henceforth ICCS) authorize the 
establishment of four RMTCIs in Southern Italy (in the regions of Puglia, Calabria, Basilicata 
and Sicily) to assist the existing MTCIs (Isveimer and Irfis) in their lending to SMEs.
46
  
The proliferation of RMTCIs in the North and Centre of Italy took place following the 
establishment of their financing institution - the Medio Credito Centrale (MCC) - in 1952, 
endowed both directly and indirectly by the Treasury.
47
 The MCC was deemed necessary by 
the BoI because the funds available to other RMTCIs were insufficient to allow adequate 
functioning and their ability to finance themselves by issuing bonds was questioned.
48
 
Moreover, the monetary authorities considered the MCC necessary to avoid an excessive 
dependence of the RMTCIs on their establishing banks and to coordinate them.
49
  
The MCC refinanced the regional institutions by discounting their bills, buying their 
medium and long-term bonds; by extending loans using returns from the issuing of its own 
bonds, and by grants to cover part of the financing to SMEs.
50
 The MCC was regulated by the 
ICCS, which fixed its rediscounting rate, the lending limit and the size of companies that 
would have been eligible for loans.
51
 These were defined as firms with fewer than 500 
workers and fixed assets below 1.5bn lire. The fact that the MCC was not placed under the 
control of the BoI, but under the ICCS, indicates that the MCC was conceived as an 
                                                          
45
 Ibid., pp. 416-421. 
46
 P. D’Onofrio and R. Pepe, ‘Le strutture creditizie nel Mezzogiorno’, in Banca d’Italia, Il sistema finanziario 
nel Mezzogiorno, Numero speciale dei Contributi all’analisi economica (Rome, 1990), p. 235. 
47
 The endowment of the MCC amounted to 60bn current lire, out of which 15bn were provided directly by the 
Treasury. The remaining 45bn were provided by the repayments of loans granted by the Treasury to industrial 
and agricultural enterprises in order to purchase equipment from the sterling area. See Banca d’Italia, Relazione 
Annuale, 1952, p. 290; Law 258/1950 is published in ABI, La legislazione, pp. 89-90. 
48
 Banca d’Italia, Relazione Annuale, 1952, p. 289. 
49
 G. Carli, ‘Le Origini del Mediocredito Centrale’, Credito Popolare, 1984/6 (1984), p. 261. 
50
 Banfi, ‘Gli Istituti’, p. 54. 
51
 G. Amato (ed.),  Il governo dell’industria in Italia (Bologna, 1972), p. 23.  
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instrument of government intervention, which was placing SMEs at the centre of its 
intervention in favour of industry.
52
 
Figure 1 below displays the geographical distribution of subsidized credit to SMEs. It 
is clear that the North benefitted most from this credit, which might be due to demand factors 
as the North was the most industrialized region of the country. Moreover, SMEs in the South 
had also access to subsidized credit and grants available in the framework of the regional 
policy. Southern firms might have found regional subsidies more easily accessible or 
institutions might have preferred to focus on other areas of the country and leave Southern 
demand to the institutions of the regional policy. 
 
Fig. 1 - Mediocredito Centrale (MCC): geographical distribution of subsidies to SMEs, 
1953-1979 
 
 
 
Source: Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione Annuale, various years 
 
                                                          
52
 Asso and Raitano, ‘Trasformazione’, pp. 427-432. 
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Data on total subsidies extended by the MCC are not complete for the 1980s. Figure 2 
below focuses on the single most important scheme managed by the MCC, i.e. the Sabatini 
scheme. This scheme provided subsidized credit for the purchase of machine tools and its 
geographical distribution is consistent with the distribution of total subsidized credit in figure 
1.  
 
Fig. 2 - Mediocredito Centrale (MCC): geographical distribution of subsidies to SMEs, 
Sabatini scheme for the purchase of machine tools 
 
Source: Mediocredito Centrale, Relazione Annuale, various years. 
Note: Sabatini scheme as a % of MCC subsidies to SMEs: 1980 = 57.4; 1981 = 56.8; 1982 =61.7; 1985 = 63.8; 
1986 = 71.9; 1990 = 74.4; 1991 = 81.9. 
 
 
5. The Artigiancassa: the institutional design 
 
After WW2 the Italian state carried out an artisanship policy on a scale that was unparalleled 
in Europe. This policy was based on the provision, on the one hand, of lower tax, and 
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employers’ contribution and welfare benefits at reduced premiums and, on the other, of 
“substitution factors”: subsidized credit, services, and promotional initiatives by state 
agencies.
53
 
In 1947 Artigiancassa (the Artisan Bank) was created, with an endowment fund of 500 
million Lire, of which half was provided by the State and 50 million Lire each by the 
following five banks: Istituto di Credito delle Casse di Risparmio Italiane, Istituto Centrale 
delle Banche Popolari, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco di Napoli and Banco di Sicilia. 
Artigiancassa was set up in order to provide credit for artisan firms, either directly or through 
the banks participating in the capital, and started its activities in 1948 after having solved 
three key matters:
54
 
1. Identification of the pool of beneficiaries of loans. For this purpose, an artisan firm 
was defined as “based mainly on labour and oriented towards the production of 
goods”, the cost of which should be “composed in a significant percentage by the 
work employed to produce them”. This definition automatically excluded service 
activities and the repair of products; 
2. The type of credit to be disbursed, which it was decided could be both short-term and 
medium-term loans; 
3. The collateral required for the granting of loans, which were divided into personal 
securities for operations of working credit, and real securities for capital equipment 
loans. 
In addition to resorting to its endowment fund, Artigiancassa could fund its operations by 
rediscounting bills and issuing bonds and securities, but was not authorized to collect 
deposits. Actually, until its transformation into a joint-stock company in 1993 – apart from a 
short time and for a limited amount of money in the 1970s – the endowment fund was the 
only source that was used.
55
 
From 1948 to 1952, Artigiancassa disbursed 6,705 loans for a total of 4.7 billion Lire, 
90 per cent of which were medium term. The loans were granted to only 1 per cent of the 
                                                          
53
 Although most frequently employers of labour, Italian artisans are taxed at the same rate as their workers and 
receive equivalent family allowances; they pay lighter social security contributions than other employers and are 
exempted from those for their apprentices; they benefit from a generous health and pension scheme, subsidized 
by the state; they receive technical and marketing assistance from various government agencies and have access 
to low-cost investment and running capital, publicly subsidized and guaranteed. See Weiss, Creating 
Capitalism, pp. 55-60. 
54
 F. Parrillo, ‘Politica di sviluppo del credito all’artigianato’, Rivista di politica economica, 49 (1959), 1185-
1248. 
55
 A. Baccini, Artigiancassa. Da Istituto di credito speciale a Banca per le imprese artigiane (Florence, 2002), 
p. 13.  
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approximately 650,000 artisan concerns recorded by the 1951 census. And nearly half of the 
transactions concerned companies located in the Lazio region, home to only 5.3 per cent of 
Italy’s artisan firms, while Artigiancassa’s loans were almost non-existent in northern Italian 
regions, where artisan firms were far more numerous.
56
 
The problems that emerged in the first five years of activity resulted in the need for a 
reform of the Artigiancassa in 1952. The reform (Law 959/52) established the abandonment 
of the concept of a specialized national institution for lending to artisan firms, prohibiting 
Artigiancassa from granting new loans. Artigiancassa was transformed into a re-discount 
institute for the banks participating in the endowment fund and all the credit societies, 
savings banks, and rural and artisan banks, which were thenceforth authorized to grant 
medium-term capital equipment loans to artisan firms. In contrast, short-term loans were 
excluded from the facilitations. In the application of the law, at this point, artisan firms were 
considered to be those concerns that resulted as such in relation to the terms of the 1948 
decree concerning family allowances.
57
 
Artigiancassa’s endowment fund was increased to 5,500 million Lire by means of a 
government allocation of 5,000 million Lire. In addition, a fund of 1,500 million Lire was 
created at Artigiancassa – disbursed in the measure of 300 million Lire each year for five 
years – for state grants for interest relief on loans to support artisan firms, disbursed by the 
authorised banks. The reform introduced four important changes with regard to the previous 
system:
58
 
1. a broader credit offering. The soft loans for artisan firms could now be distributed 
through a network of banks reaching all parts of Italy, which amounted to 5,201 
branches in 1954 (66.2 per cent of total bank branches); 
2. direct responsibility of the banks involved, which assumed the legal title and risk of 
the loans subject to the facilitations managed by Artigiancassa; 
3. the entry of these banks, involved in the disbursal of short-term loans, into the circuit 
of medium-term credit. This was a second and more direct departure – after the one 
                                                          
56
 Ibid., Tab. 1. During these five years Artigiancassa showed a marked propensity towards medium-term loans, 
which amounted to more than 85 per cent of the credit disbursed. 
57
 According to this decree, a firm was considered to be artisan if it met the following requirements: 1) the 
proprietor participated in the manual worked performed within the firm; 2) the firm exercised one of the 
activities included in a specific list prepared by the Ministry of Labour; 3) the firm employed no more than five 
workers, or no more than three workers – depending on the type of activity performed – excluding apprentices 
and members of the proprietor’s family. See P. Gualtierotti, L’impresa artigiana (Milan, 1977). 
58
 Parrillo, ‘Politica di sviluppo’. 
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envisaged with the creation of the DICs and the MTCIs – from the rule of separation 
between commercial credit and industrial credit, as ratified by the 1936 Banking Law; 
4. to reconcile the authorization awarded to these banks to grant medium-term loans to 
artisan firms with their requirements for liquidity, Artigiancassa was utilized to 
release frozen assets through re-discounting operations. 
In 1956 the Italian Parliament, after overcoming the resistance of the MPs linked to the 
Confindustria and to the two largest trade unions (the left-wing Cgil and the Catholic Cisl), 
approved the Artisan Act (Law 860/56), that defined the boundaries of artisanship. Unlike the 
German and French systems, where the artisan qualification was defined on the basis of 
professional lists of activities, the Italian artisan firm was defined on the basis of the number 
of employees.
59
 The 1956 Act established an extension of the legal definition of an artisan 
firm that was unequalled in Europe. Artisanship was therefore defined not as a professional 
category, then, but as a legal regime, membership of which entitled the owner to a wide 
variety of benefits, including access to subsidized credit.
60
 This legal arrangement opened the 
doors of artisanship to a variety of newcomers having little to do with activities of a strictly 
artisanal nature, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of artisan firms, i.e., of the 
pool of potential beneficiaries of the subsidized credit provided by Artigiancassa.
61
  
The enactment of the 1956 Artisan Act was followed by a series of provisions that 
extended the operative assignments of Artigiancassa. A law passed in the same year provided 
for:
62
 
1. an extension of the credit facilitations for the formation of the stocks of raw materials 
and products required for the firm’s production cycle, which could not exceed 20 per cent of 
the loan agreed for capital equipment, or the value of plant;
63
  
2. authorization was also granted to allow private banks to work with Artigiancassa. With 
this measure, the entire Italian banking system was authorized to grant soft loans to artisan 
firms; 
                                                          
59
 The Artisan Act established a maximum of 10 persons employed (or 20 including apprentices), with 
exceptions for cooperatives, artistic trades (e.g. ceramics, fashion, etc.), limited companies and partnerships, “as 
long as members are personally involved in the work, and as long as such work has a pre-eminent role on 
capital.” 
60
 C. Barberis, ‘L’artigianato in Italia’, in C. Barberis, G. Harvey and O. Tavone (eds), L’artigianato in Italia e 
nella Comunità Economica Europea (Milano, 1980), pp. 7-82. 
61
 Weiss, Creating Capitalism. 
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 Parrillo, ‘Politica di sviluppo’. 
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 This figure was increased to 30 per cent in 1964. 
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3. the extension of the maximum duration of the re-discount applied by Artigiancassa 
from two to five years, freeing banks still further from the risks associated with frozen assets. 
A subsequent law of 1958 increased the endowment fund of Artigiancassa from 5,500 to 
10,500 million Lire. Moreover, this law established that the net profits resulting from the 
financial statements of Artigiancassa, after deducting a rate of 20 per cent to be allocated to 
the reserve fund, were to be disbursed to the banks participating in the endowment fund, up to 
an amount equivalent to 4 per cent of the stake held by each of them. In this manner, from 
1958 onwards, the state was awarded a dividend on its stake in the endowment fund, which 
was destined to integrate the interest relief grant fund. This measure was extremely important 
because it established the interest relief grant fund upon a permanent basis, while the 1952 
law had financed it for only five years.
64
 
From 1964 to 1986 there were a further 15 allocations to the endowment fund, which at 
the end of that year stood at 1,788,5 billion lire. No further allocations took place in the 
following ten years until the privatization of Artigiancassa and its acquisition by the Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro in 1996. Allocations took place in a sporadic way until the mid-1970s. 
They became more frequent and substantial in the years from 1975 to 1986, in which 11 of 
the 18 allocations were concentrated, accounting, in real terms, for 77.7 per cent of total fund 
allocated to the endowment fund (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix).
65
 
Over time the interest relief fund became the most important intervention by 
Artigiancassa. From 1958 to 1996 it benefited of 41 allocations, that amounted to 9,157 
billion lire overall. These took place on a more regular basis than those to the endowment 
fund. Nonetheless, most of them also occurred in the years 1976 to 1986, which accounted 
for 69 per cent of the total money allocated to the fund in real terms. In this case, and 
differently from the endowment funds, allocations continued also in the 1987-96 decade, 
even at a lesser extent (see Figure A.2 in the Appendix).   
These provisions were integrated, in 1964, by the creation of a central guarantee fund at 
Artigiancassa – fed by a state allocation of 1.4 billion Lire – which facilitated loans in the 
absence of sufficient securities covering up to 70 per cent of individual bank loans. There 
were a further eight allocations between 1966 and 1978, bringing the fund up to 12.175 
billion Lire (see Figure A.3 in the Appendix). Then this fund was no longer enhanced until 
1997, when a further 50 billion lire were allocated to it.
66
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 Parrillo, ‘Politica di sviluppo’. 
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 Baccini, Artigiancassa, pp. 32-37. 
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 Ibid, Table A4. 
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6. Subsidized credit by Artigiancassa: overall results 
 
 
Overall, from 1953 to 1996, Artigiancassa assisted 1,805,896 loans with subsidized 
credit worth 54,361 billion lire. Of these, 22.7 per cent also benefited from the discounting 
operation and 14.7 per cent of the state guarantee (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). It is 
possible to identify four phases in the activity of Artigiancassa. The first one goes from 1953 
to 1966. The number of loans increased slightly until 1962 and dropped to the level of the late 
1950s after that date (see Figure 3). The average loan value follows the same dynamics as the 
total amount of the loans disbursed (the correlation coefficient between the two variables is 
0.90). The proportion of discounted loans is high until the late 1950s (always above 40 per 
cent with a 75 per cent peak in 1957), then it drops substantially in the early 1960s before it 
jumps again to 60 per cent in 1965 (see Figure 4). 
The second phase goes from 1967 to 1976 and is characterized by a growth in both 
the number and the average value of loans, with the latter increasing from 45 to 83 million 
lire (at 1998 prices). The proportion of discounted loans drops to less than 30 per cent while 
guaranteed loans also make their appearance, but their proportion never exceeds 15 per cent 
of total loans disbursed. The third phase includes the years from 1977 to 1988 and seems to 
mark a deep change in the strategy of Artigiancassa. The increased state funding enabled 
Artigiancassa to expand its activity substantially. In fact, from 1977 to 1988 it granted 
987,169 subsidized loans, that is 2.7 times as many as in the 1953-76 period, when there were 
370,117 overall. If in the 1953-76 period Artigiancassa granted an average of 15,422 loans a 
year, in the 1977-88 period the number of loans rose by 5.3 times to 82,264 a year. The more 
bountiful resources that had been made available to Artigiancassa were used to increase the 
total amount of subsidized loans, but not their average value that decreased from 72.7 million 
lire in the 1967-76 years to 64.0 million in lire in the 1977-88 years (at 1998 prices). 
Thus the impression is that until the mid-1970s, when funding was relatively scant, 
available resources were channelled to a relatively small number of artisan firms, selected 
from those that presented the most promising possibilities for development, which were 
boosted by granting them loans of an increasing unitary amount. Conversely, the increased 
funding of Artigiancassa from the mid-1970s to the late-1980s seems to have responded to a 
different logic, that is to make subsidized credit available to everybody (or at least to as many 
artisans as possible) by scattering it into a large number of loans of a smaller average amount. 
This seems a strategy more coherent with the DC’s original social project that was to foster 
the proliferation of micro-firms and not to boost the growth of individual firms. However, 
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such a change in the Artigiancassa’s policy is also compatible with a consensus-building 
strategy aimed at appeasing a vast stratum of the middle-class whose support was perceived 
as very important to the electoral fortunes of both the DC and the PCI at a time in which 
lobbying  by artisan associations had become more pressing than in the previous decades.
67
 
The scattering of loan disbursement to the largest number of applicants seems even more 
impressive (or puzzling) if we observe that it occurred at a time when the expansion of the 
artisan sector had come virtually to a halt. In fact, the number of artisan firms registered with 
provincial Chambers of Commerce rose by 68 per cent (from 664,073 to 1,115,297) in the 
1958-66 years and by another 17 per cent in the 1967-76 period (at the end of which they 
numbered 1,305,859). Their increase slowed further down in 1977-88 years, when they 
reached a 1,455,547 peak in 1984 before dropping to 1,421,762 in 1988 despite the new 1985 
Artisan Act (Law 448/85) had further enhanced the size-limit set to be registered as an artisan 
firm.
68
 Thus, the overall increase in the number of artisan firms in the 1977-88 years 
amounted to just 9 per cent, which – in an economic perspective – would probably justify an 
opposite strategy to that pursued by Artigiancassa, that is, to concentrate the provision of 
subsidized credit in a smaller number of loans of a higher amount to prompt the growth of the 
more promising concerns. 
Lastly, the fourth phase goes from 1989 to 1996 and is characterized by a decrease of 
the number of loans disbursed and by a stability of their amount, whose average remained at 
same level as in the 1977-88 period.  
The proportion of loans granted by Artigiancassa to total subsidized credit disbursed 
in Italy rose from 0.45 per cent in the 1953-66 years to 0.80 percent in 1967-76 years and 
reached a 2.22 peak in the 1980-88 years. Thus, the activity of Artigiancassa grew not only in 
absolute terms but also as a proportion of the whole system of subsidized credit in Italy to 
highlight the will of the policy-maker to prompt the artisan sector that had its highest thrust in 
the 1980s.
69
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 D. Pesole, L’artigianato nell’economia italiana. Dal dopoguerra a oggi (Milan, 1997). 
68 The new size limits were the following: a) if no series work was undertaken: up to 18 employees (including 
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 Baccini, Artigiancassa, Table 5. 
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De Cecco and Ferri
70
 showed the anti-cyclical trend of subsidized credit in Italy which was 
principally due to the necessity for firms to extend their debts during recessions. 
Artigiancassa stands as an exception to this since its shows a pro-cyclical behaviour. In fact, 
there is a positive correlation between the dynamics of the amount of loans granted by 
Artigiancassa and business cycles (0.18). This might be the consequence of the behaviour of 
banks that probably saw as less risky to lend money to artisans during the expansionary 
phases of the business cycle. 
 
Fig. 3 - Loans that received interest subsidy from Artigiancassa 
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Fig. 4- Percentage of subsidized loans discounted and guaranteed by Artigiancassa 
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7. Artigiancassa: the regional pattern 
 
Moving from the national to the regional distribution of loans by Artigiancassa, two 
interesting patterns emerge. The first shows that firms located in the North and in the Centre 
have been long favoured over the Southern counterparts. Secondly, there is a correlation 
between those areas receiving the larger proportion of loans, and the regions where artisan 
firms have been particularly vibrant, even if this trait fades over time. 
In the mid-1950s the geographical distribution of loans still showed a strong 
concentration in the Lazio region. As a result, in 1955 the Centre regions accounted for more 
than 50 per cent of the loans disbursed, followed by the North with little less than 30 per cent 
and by the South with 18 per cent (see Figure 5). Then the North started a staggering increase 
which led it to reach a 76 per cent peak in 1968, whereas the shares of the Centre and of the 
South decrease substantially. Since the 1970s the Centre remains stable with about 20 per 
cent of the loans disbursed, the North progressively reduces its share whereas the South 
increases it. The upsurge of the South becomes substantial starting from 1978, that is in the 
period of the largest allocations to the Interest Relief Fund, to probably highlight a link 
between the two events.   
The North-Eastern and Central regions – the so-called “Third Italy”, the area well 
known for its development based on SMEs and industrial districts – benefited most from state 
support both in absolute terms and in relation to the size of its artisan sector (see table A.2 in 
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the Appendix). This area accounted for 41 per cent of all concerns and almost 60 per cent of 
beneficiaries by 1971. Firms located in the Northwest were also favoured in loan distribution 
(27 per cent of concerns and 32 per cent of beneficiaries) whilst the backward South was 
clearly penalized (32 per cent of concerns and only 9 per cent of beneficiaries). 
However, in the 1970s, firms located in the Centre-North – and especially in the 
North-East – continued to receive a larger proportion of funds than their southern 
counterparts, even though the gap had diminished at the end of the decade (see Table A.3 in 
the Appendix). The gap had further reduced in 1988, to show that the increased funding of 
Artigiancassa from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s was used also to rebalance loan allocation 
in favour of the more backward South. In 1993 for the first time the Southern regions 
accounted for a proportion of beneficiaries higher than the proportion of concerns. Such a 
readdressing of loan allocation was probably a way to compensate Southern firms for the fact 
that they could no longer benefit from funds that in the previous years were provided by the 
Agency for the economic development of the South (the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno) that had 
been closed down in 1992. 
These results were determined by three principal factors: 1) the evolution of the 
policy of Artigiancassa, which over time turned out to attribute greater importance to the 
penetration of subsidized credit also in Italy’s more backward and peripheral regions; 2) the 
structure of the banking system, as the banks – especially the local banks – that assumed the 
direct responsibility of the loans subject to the facilitations managed by Artigiancassa were 
located mainly in the regions of the “Third Italy”; 3) the regional concentration of the 
demand for subsidized loans. In fact, the latter was sustained by the artisan associations – the 
Confartigianato in the “white” regions and the Cna in the “red” ones – that acted as 
intermediaries between artisan firms and the banks and were in turn very strong in the “Third 
Italy”.71 
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Figure 5 – Artigiancassa: geographical distribution of subsidies 
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8. Provisional conclusions 
 
Italian SMEs and IDs came to the forefront of scholarly research in the late 1970s 
when their resilience to the oil-shock crises became evident. This pattern of business 
organisation gained international attention with milestone work by Brusco, Piore and Sabel, 
Best and Sabel and Zeitlin.
72
 While stressing their importance, this literature also interpreted 
SMEs and IDs as a spontaneous industrial pattern and a revival of modes of production pre-
existent to the emergence of mass-production systems. Researchers did acknowledge the 
contribution of institutions to the development of SMEs and IDs. However, those institutions 
were mainly local, such as local government, associations of artisans and industrialists and 
chambers of commerce, which provided valuable services. 
The path-breaking work by Francesca Carnevali brought to our attention the nexus 
between a suitable banking structure and the development of SMEs in Italy, as well as 
Germany and France. Conversely, this nexus helps explain the decline of SMEs in Britain. 
The Italian banking system fragmented geographically and in terms of market segments 
                                                          
72
 Brusco, ‘The Emilian Model: Productive Decentralization and Social Intgeration,’ Cambridge Journal of 
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enabled local banks, mainly cooperative and savings banks, to flourish together with the local 
business community. As banks and firms belonged to the same regional economic fabric it 
was much less costly for the former to acquire non-formalised information on the latter, thus 
reducing asymmetric information.
73  
Studies on the financing of SMEs in the USA, an economy closer to the ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ model than the continental European one, strengthen Carnevali’s argument. Studies 
on the financing of SMEs in the late 19
th
 - early 20
th
 century and in the late 20
th
 century show 
the importance of local commercial banks (the counterpart of ordinary banks in the Italian 
system). The research on the later period highlights also the importance of ‘relationship’ 
lending, where banks are in contact with the firms and its business environment for a 
prolonged period of time.
74
 Similarly to the Italian banking system, the American one was 
segmented geographically and in terms of market segments. The Glass-Steagal Act of 1933 
restricted ordinary banks to their traditional activity of accepting deposits and lending. These 
were prohibited from buying shares in corporations or undertaking investment banking 
activities. Moreover, commercial banks, both National (Federal) and State banks were 
restricted to opening branches within the boundaries of their home state. Banks did try to 
overcome this restriction by forming associations with banks in other states.
75
  However, it 
was not until the early 1990s that the wave of cross-state consolidations took place with the 
repeal of the interstate banking restrictions.
76
  
The central tenet of Carnevali’s thesis is that the banking structure was not the result 
of market forces, but rather it was shaped by political and economic institutions on the basis 
of political, social and economic considerations. Linda Weiss had already pointed out the 
non-neutrality of the Italian state to the industrial pattern of the country. However, rather than 
focusing on the banking system, Weiss explained the introduction of policy tools and 
financial subsidies for SMEs and artisan firms as the Christian Democratic Party’s attempt to 
promote a diffused ownership, so to avoid a polarization of society between large firms and 
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the proletariat. The ruling party saw the middle class as a strong component of its 
constituency.77 
This paper has discussed the political and economic rationales behind the structure of 
the banking system and explored the system of medium-term credit and financial subsidies 
established in the country to promote the development of SMEs, which were viewed as an 
important component of the Italian economy by the end of the Second World War. The 
discussion has shown how all political forces, as well as trade unions and the BoI, agreed on 
fostering SMEs. 
Finally, this paper and Carnevali’s comparative work on banking systems can be 
placed within the context of Rondo Cameron’s nexus between a country’s financial 
institutions and its industrialization. Most importantly the plank of their arguments is fully 
consistent, i.e. financial systems are shaped by legal, social and political traditions as well as 
the country’s economic conditions.78 
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APPENDIX 
 
Fig. A.1 - Allocations to the endowment fund (million lire – 1998 prices) 
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Fig. A.2 - Allocations to the interest relief fund (million lire – 1998 prices) 
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Fig. A.3 - Allocations to the central guarantee fund (million lire – 1998 prices) 
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Table A.1. Loans granted by Artigiancassa, 1953-1996 (current values - million lire) 
 Subsidised loans Discounted loans State guaranteed loans 
 No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount 
1953 270 416 172 257   
1954 1,836 2,804 822 1,274   
1955 2,658 4,288 1,870 2,961   
1956 2,966 4,763 1,751 2,825   
1957 4,393 7,330  3,294 5,414   
1958 6,483 12,036  4,023 7,284   
1959 7,900 16,451 3,696 7,424   
1960 10,532 25,189 5,048 12,099   
1961 15,069 38,994 2,458 5,671   
1962 15,396 42,156 3,592 8,888   
1963 14,682 45,137 4,454 12,629   
1964 12,398 38,787 3,368 9,862   
1965 8,699 27,073 5,413 16,356   
1966 5,572 17,905 2,315 7,169 55 144 
1967 18,494 70,652 5,373 20,992 665 2,756 
1968 24,263 120,009 5,039 24,198 1,634 8,648 
1969 19,625 104,330 3,298 17,095 1,944 11,215 
1970 16,525 92,631 2,837 16,069 1,387 8,732 
1971 20,016 114,591 4,668 26,416 1,684 11,031 
1972 25,969 182,549 3,911 26,467 2,323 17,909 
1973 40,540 312,197 3,989 31,783 4,494 37,462 
1974 17,796 148,745 3,437 30,596 2,386 21,496 
1975 30,983 319,574 6,898 64,793 4,007 43,385 
1976 47,052 605,985 8,688 105,743 6,399 83,671 
1977 52,290 683,126 9,336 128,354 7,773 106,119 
1978 49,447 659,085 6,841 97,310 8,116 117,821 
1979 54,095 735,616 8,014 116,393 8,531 128,107 
1980 79,065 1,246,976 13,151 197,015 11,186 190,039 
1981 61,475 1,327,831 16,679 344,817 9,416 216,958 
1982 147,414 3,271,874 18,236 431,632 18,249 458,772 
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1983 76,736 2,153,650 25,257 661,550 13,221 379,109 
1984 65,620 2,105,142 27,463 804,774 12,867 407,327 
1985 91,125 3,514,311 22,573 859,694 16,127 622,899 
1986 89,270 3,671,747 24,593 886,883 14,604 603,091 
1987 103,561 4,401,214 21,669 958,444 18,417 815,177 
1988 117,132 5,024,887 28,937 1,316,645 20,112 936,675 
1989 45,898 2,113,419 17,227 852,756 14,457 677,863 
1990 87,665 3,897,504 3,902 195,621 18,778 1,010,397 
1991 55,798 2,646,827 33,907 1,741,183 12,641 669,577 
1992 43,942 2,023,352 22,591 1,277,340 12,195 696,195 
1993 75,992 3,669,914 19,080 1,166,861 4,537 273,470 
1994 55,155 2,869,223   2,214 134,327 
1995 44,793 2,997,902   8,314 576,264 
1996 39,367 2,995,722   6,992 537,238 
Source: Baccini (2002: Table A.7). 
 
 
Table A.2 - Regional distribution of artisan proprietors and firms financed by Artigiancassa, 1953-1971. 
Region Firms financed (1953-1971) Artisan proprietors
1 
% of regional firms financed 
Piedmont 7.8 8.6 12.9 
Valle d’Aosta 0.1 0.2 3.2 
Lombardy 22.2 15.3 20.5 
Liguria 2.0 3.2 8.7 
Total Northwest 32.1 27.3 16.6 
Trentino-Alto Adige 0.6 1.5 5.9 
Veneto 11.9 7.7 22.1 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1.7 2.2 10.8 
Emilia-Romagna 19.0 10.1 26.7 
Total Northeast 33.2 21.5 21.9 
Tuscany 8.9 8.0 15.8 
Marches 8.5 3.4 35.4 
Umbria 2.5 1.6 23.3 
Lazio 5.6 6.2 12.9 
Total Centre 25.5 19.2 19.0 
Abruzzi 1.4 2.3 9.0 
Molise 0.4 0.7 7.8 
Campania 1.8 6.0 4.2 
Apulia 1.7 5.6 4.2 
Basilicata 0.2 1.0 3.1 
Calabria 1.2 2.8 6.1 
Sicily 2.3 10.9 3.0 
Sardinia 0.2 2.6 0.9 
Total South 9.2 32.0 4.1 
Total Italy 100.0 100.0 14.2 
Source: Weiss (1988, Tables F-G). 
1
 Artisan concerns registered with provincial Chambers of Commerce on 31 Dec. 1970. 
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Table A.3 – Regional distribution of artisan proprietors and firms financed by Artigiancassa, 1973, 1978, 1983, 
1988, 1993 
 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 
Region Loans Firms
1 
Loans Firms
2 
Loans Firms
3 
Loans Firms
4 
Loans Firms
5 
Piedmont 10.0 8.5 14.2 9.1 4.8 8.8 12.4 9.4 10.0 9.1 
Valle d’Aosta 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 
Lombardy 25.2 15.8 17.7 17.1 29.6 18.5 18.2 18,3 10.2 18.4 
Liguria 2.1 3.2 2.2 3.2 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.2 4.7 3.1 
Total North-West 37.5 27.8 34.1 29.7 37.5 30.7 34.4 31.2 25.0 30.9 
Trentino-Alto Adige 1.9 1.4 0.8 1.6 - 1.6 - 0.8 - 1.6 
Veneto 14.0 8.0 10.8 8.9 7.6 9.3 7.5 9.8 7.2 9.8 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 1.0 2.2 0.6 2.3 0.6 2.4 1.5 2.3 1.9 2.3 
Emilia-Romagna 20.5 10.0 19.5 10.1 15.1 10.0 17.8 9.8 13.7 9.7 
Total North-East 37.4 21.6 31.7 22.9 23.3 23.3 26.8 22.7 22.8 23.4 
Tuscany 9.0 8.0 9.1 8.0 10.3 7.9 6.7 8.3 4.9 8.2 
Marches 5.3 3.5 6.2 3.6 6.7 3.6 4.7 3.7 5.0 3.6 
Umbria 2.4 1.5 2.6 1.5 3.4 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.0 1.7 
Latium 2.4 6.6 2.8 6.5 2.3 6.2 4.2 6.3 7.3 6.1 
Totale Centre 19.1 19.6 20.7 19.6 22.7 19.4 17.3 20.0 18.2 19.6 
Abruzzi 1.1 2.2 1.4 2.5 1.5 2.3 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.4 
Molise 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.5 
Campania 0.7 5.7 1.8 5.8 3.2 5.6 3.2 5.8 5.2 5.8 
Apulia 2.0 5.3 4.8 5.3 4.3 5.3 4.4 5.7 4.3 5.5 
Basilicata 0.4 0.8 1.4 0.8 1.5 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 
Calabria 0.5 2.6 1.7 2.3 1.5 2.1 1.6 2.3 0.7 2.4 
Sicily 0.7 11.1 1.1 10.5 2.2 7.4 4.5 5.8 9.4 5.8 
Sardinia 0.4 2.6 0.7 n.a. 1.7 2.4 4.5 2.7 10.3 2.7 
Total South and isles 6.0 31.0 13.5 27.8 16.5 26.6 21.5 26.1 34.0 26.1 
Total Italy 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Baccini (2002: Tables A.11-A.12) 
1
 Artisan concerns registered with provincial Chambers of Commerce on 31 Dec. 1973. 
2
 Artisan concerns registered with provincial Chambers of Commerce on 31 Dec. 1978. 
3
 Artisan concerns registered with provincial Chambers of Commerce on 31 Dec. 1983. 
4
 Artisan concerns registered with provincial Chambers of Commerce on 31 Dec. 1990. 
5
 Artisan concerns registered with provincial Chambers of Commerce on 31 Dec. 1993. 
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